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the court's if the observations on which his opinion is based are
peculiarly within his experience and cannot be transmitted completely or accurately to the court. In fact, when the principal
qualification of a witness to render an opinion is his technical
background or training or his long acquaintance with the person
or situation in question, the witness is actually incapable of remembering all factors affecting his judgment. Even if he tries
to remember them, he is unlikely to succeed in conveying to the
court the impression they made on him. Facts convincing to the
witness and which would have been convincing to judge or jury
had they observed them are lost or rendered unconvincing in the
process of intermediate communication. The court should not,
therefore, attempt to reach its own conclusions on the secondhand facts. It should accept an opinion if it can be ascertained
that the witness has been in a position to observe the facts, has
actually observed them, and is capable of forming thereon a relevant conclusion. In the case under consideration the psychiatrist
had treated the defendant for at least six weeks prior to her
transfer to a sanitarium and after her return therefrom. The lay
witness apparently had known the defendant for about fifteen
years. Their qualifications could have been considered sufficient
for the admission of their opinions.

Confessions
In State v. Ellis the supreme court correctly held error the
admission of a written confession alleged to be voluntary, but
which showed on its face that an inducement for confession had
been offered by the interrogating officer.8
VIII.

CRIMINAL LAW AND PROCEDURE
Dale E. Bennett*

A.

CRIMINAL LAW

Only three of the numerous criminal cases which were appealed to the Louisiana Supreme Court during the 1944-1945
judicial terms involved questions as to the interpretation and
6. Id. at § 1924.
7. 207 La. 812, 22 So. (2d) 181 (1945).

8. Art. 451, La. Code of Crim. Proc. of 1928: "Before what purposes to be
a confession can be introduced in evidence, it must be affirmatively shown
that it was free and voluntary, and not made under the influence of fear,
duress, intimidation, menaces, threats, inducements or promises."
In view of the very definite statement of the above article, it is somewhat discouraging to note that the court cited decisions of the United States
Supreme Court and some of its own on the same point. One of the alleged

advantages of codified law is economy of effort.
0 Associate Professor of Law, Louisiana State University.
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construction of articles of the Criminal Code. This paucity of
appealable questions of substantive criminal law is encouraging
and compares very favorably with pre-code years where a considerable amount of judicial legerdemain was required in order
to fathom the overly technical common law distinctions and to
ascertain whether a particular type of antisocial conduct was
included in the lengthy, but nevertheless incomplete, enumerations which typified our criminal statutes.'
Voluntary Intoxication
It is well settled that voluntary drunkenness does not, in
general, exempt a man from criminal responsibility. The irresponsible inebriate is subject to the same standard of conduct as
the sober man. An exception to this rule is recognized in those
cases where the intoxicated condition has rendered the offender
incapable of entertaining a specific intent or having a special
2
knowledge which is an essential element of a particular crime.
For example, proof of drunkenness would be admissible in a burglary prosecution wherein it must be shown that the defendant
had a specific intent to commit a forcible felony or theft when he
entered the building or structure.3 In State v. Johnston4 the
court properly applied the general rule and concluded that voluntary drunkenness would not constitute a defense to the crime
of aggravated assault. The court pointed out that the word
"intentional" in the definition of an assault 5 only referred to a
general criminal intent. This interpretation was a logical application of Article 11 of the Criminal Code, wherein it is stated that
the word "intentional," unless further qualified, has reference to
"general criminal intent" as distinguished from the "specific criminal intent" which is an essential element of some crimes.
1. The difficulties inherent in the numerous and overlapping aggravated
assault and battery statutes are nicely illustrated by State v. Antoine, 189 La.
619, 180 So. 465 (1938) and State v. Dent, 189 La. 159, 179 So. 67 (1938). The
decision in State v. Gendusa, 193 La. 59, 190 So. 332 (1939) focused attention
upon the over-emphasis placed by Louisiana's prolix and cumbersome burglary statute upon the requirement of a "breaking." The seriousness of
defendant's conduct appeared to emanate from the opening of an unlatched
screen door, rather than from the fact that he entered a defenseless dwelling
at night and beat the sleeping occupants into a state of insensibility. The
limited common law conception of the term "property" prevented the conviction of a defendant who had obtained a painter's "services" by false pretense in State v. Smith, 195 La. 783, 197 So. 429 (1940), noted in (1940) 3
LoUISIANA LAW REVIgw 236.

2. Art. 15, La. Crim. Code of 1942. Accord: Clark and Marshall, Law of
Crimes (4 ed. 1940) HI90 and 95.
3. Arts. 60-62, La. Crim. Code of 1942.
4. 207 La. 161, 20 So. (2d) 741 (1944).
5. Art. 36, La. Crim. Code of 1942.
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In the Johnston case, defense counsel also argued that the
defendant was so drunk that "he was incapable of distinguishing
between right and wrong." The court overruled this contention
and upheld the trial judge's conclusion that the facts did not
establish such a complete state of drunkenness. It is important
to note, however, that regardless of the facts found, the defendant's argument is without merit. The "right and wrong" test,
adopted in Article 14 of the Criminal Code, applies only to those
cases where the incapacity is a result of "a mental disease or
mental defect." It has no application where drunkenness is the
immediate cause of the incapacity.'
Aggravated Assault-Unloaded Gun
Article 36 of the Louisiana Criminal Code adopted the
broader view that either an attempted battery or the placing of
another in reasonable apprehension of receiving a battery, shall
constitute an assault. In State v. Johnston, where the defendant
threatened a group of people with an unloaded revolver, there
was no question but that, in conformity with the above definition, he had committed an assault. The question presented was
whether or not, in view of the surrounding circumstances which
would naturally lead the victims to believe that the gun was
loaded, he had committed an "aggravated" assault, i.e., an assault
with a dangerous weapon." In holding that the unloaded revolver,
under the circumstances, constituted a dangerous weapon, the
Louisiana Supreme Court stressed the fact that the persons assaulted had heard shots fired immediately before the defendant
threatened them and would naturally suppose that the gun was
loaded. Such terror, reasoned the court, might induce the victim
to kill or inflict serious injury in attempting to avert the apparent danger.
While the definition of an assault embraces both the objective and the subjective standards, the more serious crime of
aggravated assault requires the actual use of a "dangerous.
weapon." A "dangerous weapon" is specifically defined in Article
2 of the Code as an instrumentality which "is calculated or likely
to produce death or great bodily harm." This would indicate a
legislative intent that the more serious crime of aggravated assault should be limited to those cases where the weapon used
6. State v. Haab, 105 La. 230, 29 So. 725 (1901).
7. 207 La. 161, 20 So. (2d) 741 (1944), noted in (1945) 6 LOUISIANA LAW REvIsw 294.
8. Art. 37, La. Crim. Code of 1942.
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was in fact dangerous. Elsewhere in the Code, the actual probability of danger to human life or limb is frequently used as the
distinguishing factor between the aggravated and simple grades
of an offense." Courts in other jurisdictions, interpreting similar
statutory provisions, have held that the actual nature of the
weapon in the manner used, and not the apprehension of the
victim, is the proper criterion for determining the nature of the
assault committed.'0 Such an interpretation is also in accord
with the generally accepted rule that criminal statutes are to be
strictly construed in favor of the accused.
Perjury-FalseSwearing
The felony of perjury is so defined in the Criminal Code as to
include false testimony before a court or an administrative tribunal.11 All other false oaths, where such oath is required by
law, are treated as coming within the lesser crime of false swearing,12 which is a misdemeanor. When the Criminal Code was
adopted, existing criminal perjury and false swearing statutes
were expressly repealed. A number of civil statutes contained
provisions penalizing false oaths. These penal clauses were not
expressly repealed because of practical considerations. An accurate repeal of such provisions would have required a comprehensive survey of Louisiana's civil statutory laws, for the clauses
were found in civil, rather than criminal, statutes. Also, there
was a fear that a separate repeal of the penal clauses might result in attacks upon the statutes affected; and a complete reenactment of the statutes, omitting the clauses in question, was
fraught with the possibility of an inadvertent omission which
might seriously impair the statutes' efficacy. As a result such
penal provisions in civil statutes were not included in the list
of statutes expressly repealed 13 or in the list of statutes expressly
saved." In this regard, the draftsmen's suggested interpretation,
as found in the comment to the false swearing article, is significant. They state:
9. See Arts. 51-52 (arson), Arts 55-56 (criminal damage to property), and
Arts 60-62 (burglary), La. Crim. Code of 1942.
10. Price v. United States, 156 Fed. 950 (C. C. A. 9th, 1907); Territory
of Arizona v. Gomes, 14 Ariz. 139, 125 Pac 702 (1912); People v. Sylva, 143 Cal.
62, 76 Pac. 814 (1904); People v. Montgomery, 15 Cal. App. 315, 114 Pac. 792
(1911); State v. Godfrey, 17 Ore. 300, 20 Pac. 625 (1889); Luitze v. State, 204
Wis. 78, 234 N.W. 382 (1931).
11. Art 123, La. Crim. Code of 1942.
12. Art. 125, La. Crim. Code of 1942.
13. La. Act 43 of 1942, §2.
14. Id. at §3.
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"A number of civil statutes contain penal provisions in regard
to false oaths. Where such statute provides a penalty for the
false oath, it should not be affected by the new code provisions on false swearing, and the offender may be tried either
for false swearing or under the penal provision of the civil
statute, at the discretion of the prosecuting authority. See
Article 4, supra. Where such statute merely declared that such
false swearing 'shall constitute perjury and be punished as
such,' the provision may no longer be effective, since perjury
does not include extrajudicial oaths. In such cases the offender would be punishable under the false-swearing article
of the Code." 15
This anticipated problem confronted the court in State v.
Smith' where the defendants were charged with the crime of
"false swearing" by taking a false oath for the purpose of securing
an absentee voter's ballot. The absentee voting law" contained
a clause providing that any person who wilfully swore falsely to
an affidavit for an absentee ballot shall "be guilty of perjury and
shall be punished in such case as is by law provided." Following
the suggested interpretation of the draftsmen of the Criminal
Code, the grand jury indicted for "false swearing."
The Louisiana Supreme Court, however, decided that the
special penal provision in the absentee voting law, which conflicted with the definition of perjury in Article 123 of the Criminal Code, was not impliedly repealed thereby. In holding that
the clause was not "repugnant" to the relevant provisions of the
Criminal Code, Chief Justice O'Niell stressed the fact that such
penal clauses were special provisions and not impliedly repealed
by the general Code articles on the subject. This position was
strengthened by the fact that a 1942 statute providing for absentee voting by electors in the armed services, contained a similar provision declaring that a false affidavit for a ballot should
constitute "perjury." That the court's decision is not to be limited to this particular statute is clearly indicated. Chief Justice
O'Niell specifically pointed out that the absentee voting law was
not the only instance where the legislature had designated nonjudicial swearing as perjury, and indicated that all such provisions would control over the more general provisions in the
Criminal Code.
15. Art. 125, La. Crim. Code of 1942.
16. 207 La. 735, 21 So. (2d) 890 (1945).
17. La. Act 61 of 1921 (E.S.).
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In the case at bar, the decision meant that the offender would
go free because of an accidental omission of the word "false"
which rendered the perjury article insufficient as a definition of
that offense. This error was corrected in 194418 and a person violating such a clause as the one involved in State v. Smith will
now be prosecuted for perjury.
The decision in the Smith case is an important one. It settles an issue which had bothered the draftsmen of the Code, by
holding that these special types of non-judicial false oaths shall
constitute the felony of perjury, rather than the misdemeanor of
false swearing. Even though one may not agree with the decision, he should appreciate the practical benefit of having a definite judicial determination of this issue.
Narcotics Drug Act
Defense counsel, in State v. Shotts,19 clutched at the proverbial last straw in an attack upon the validity of Louisiana's
Narcotic Drug Act. 20 An argument that the act was impliedly
repealed by the Criminal Code2 1 was without merit since the
subject matter is not included in that body of laws, nor were
the provisions of the act shown to be repugnant to any provision
of the Criminal Code. The argument, frequently urged in broadside constitutional attacks, that the body of the act was broader
than its title, was likewise found to be without merit. It is not
necessary that a statutory title shall contain a detailed enumeration of all the proscribed activity.22 Probably the most novel
argument was defense counsel's attack based upon the penalty
clause of the Narcotic Drug Act which fixed the punishment at
not less than twenty months nor more than five years at hard
labor. This, counsel urged, was in contravention of the 1942.
amendment to Article 529 of the Louisiana Code of Criminal
Procedure" which abolished the indeterminate sentence and
made it mandatory for the judge to impose a determinate or fixed
sentence in all convictions. In overruling this contention,
Justice Fournet pointed out that a penalty clause which fixes the
minimum and maximum penalties, empowering the judge in his
discretion to impose a penalty within those limits, is not inconsistent with the provision in Article 529 which requres that the
18.
19.
20.
21.
22.

La.
207
La.
La.
See

Act 224 of 1944.
La. 898, 22 So. (2d) 209 (1945).
Act 14 of 1934 (2 E.S.) as amended by La. Act 6 of 1944.
Act 43 of 1942.
Comment, Constitutional Limitations upon Statute Titles in Louisiana (1944) 6 LOUISIANA LAW REVIEW 72.
23. La. Act 46 of 1942.
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sentence actually imposed must be a determinate one for a fixed
period of time. The penalty provided in the Narcotic Drug Act
is in accord with modern theory and practice in the drafting of
criminal laws. It affords the judge an opportunity to consider
the offender and the circumstances of the offense, as well as the
particular crime committed, in fixing the punishment. The sentence actually imposed, however, must conform with the procedural mandate of Article 529 and must be for a definite period of
time.
B. CRIMINAL PROCEDURE
Prescription
Article 8 of the Code of Criminal Procedure establishes two
general prescriptive periods for felony prosecutions. The indictment must be found within one year after the offense is made
known to the proper authorities; also, the defendant must be
tried within three years after the indictment is found. 2' This
latter prescriptive period was originally fixed at six years, but
was reduced to three years by Act 323 of 1942. The Criminal
Code, covering the substantive law of crimes, was adopted at the
same session of the legislature2 5 and a general procedural statute
(Act 147 of 1942) was adopted for the purpose of synchronizing
the Criminal Code with the Code of Criminal Procedure. Along
with other revisions, this statute amended Article 8 of the Code
of Criminal Procedure so as to adjust the list of serious felonies
excepted from the prescriptive period to the new offenses and
legal terminology of the Criminal Code. It also adopted the rule,
declared as legislative policy by Act 323, that a period of three
years allowed adequate time for bringing the accused to trial in
felony cases. Since Act 147 was enacted to correlate the existing
rule of criminal procedure and the new substantive law, it was
expressly limited to "crimes committed after the effective date
of the Criminal Code."
In State v. Shushan," the defendants had committed a crime
in October, 1937. They were indicted in 1940 and brought to trial
in April, 1943. In upholding the trial judge's ruling that a nolle
prosequi should be entered, the supreme court applied the three
year prescriptive period as set out in Act 323. Justice Rogers
24. See Comment, Prescription of Criminal Prosecutions (1945) 6 LOUISANA
LAW REWiSw 274.
25. La. Act 43 of 1942.
26. 206 La. 415, 19 So. (2d) 185 (1944).
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declared that "where two acts relating to the same subject matter are passed at the same legislative session, there is a strong
presumption against implied repeal, and they are to be construed
together, if possible, so as to reconcile them, giving effect to
each. ''27 Both Act 323 and Act 147 were declaratory of the sound
legislative policy that three years is adequate time for bringing
a person accused of a felony to trial, and both acts "stand together
by holding that Act 323 of 1942 applies to crimes committed prior
to the effective date of the Criminal Code, and that Act 147 of
1942, as it, in plain terms, declares, applies to crimes committed
subsequent to the effective date of the code. '28 This construction
is strengthened by the fact that Act 323 uses the old terminology
of crimes in listing those offenses which are excepted from the
prescriptive period, while Act 147 has adjusted the excepted offenses to the new Criminal Code.
The court's conclusions as to the effect of the accused's absence from the state for ten months while serving his sentence
in a federal prison, are also worthy of note. First, Justice Rogers
held that the requirement of Article 9 of the Code of Criminal
Procedure, that a defendant must obtain permission from the
court before leaving its jurisdiction, meant "voluntary" absence
from the state, and did not apply to the defendant who was involuntarily removed to a federal prison. Secondly, the period of
incarceration in the federal penitentiary was counted in computing the three year prescriptive period. The court pointed out
that a procedure was available whereby the federal prisoner
could have been brought back for trial in the state court. This
holding may be distinguished from the decision in State v.
Theard,29 that the prescriptive period was suspended when the
defendant was adjudged insane shortly after indictment and was,
therefore, not amenable to prosecution.
Drawing of Grand Jury
After completing the general venire list, the jury commission is mandated to select therefrom twenty names of citizens
posessing the qualifications of grand jurors. The names thus selected are to be written on slips of paper and placed in an envelope-these names constitute the grand jury list.s° As soon as
27. 206 La. 415, 431, 19 So. (2d) 185, 190, citing 59 C. J. Statutes §533,
pages 928, 929.
28. 206 La. 415, 432, 19 So. (2d) 185, 191.
29. 203 La. 1026, 14 So. (2d) 824 (1943).
30. Art. 180, La. Code of Crim. Proc. of 1928.
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practicable thereafter, the district judge shall select a foreman
from the list, and the sheriff shall draw eleven names from the
envelope by lot. These twelve shall constitute the grand jury. 1
In State v. Stel, 2 the jury commission had met and regularly
selected twenty names to compose the grand jury list. On the
date set for the empaneling of the grand jury the judge appointed
a foreman who was duly sworn. After the sheriff had drawn
eleven additional names from the grand jury envelope, but before those jurors were sworn, the presiding judge examined the
envelope and discovered that six of the twenty name slips had
been glued to the bottom of the envelope. Thereupon he refused to permit the eleven prospective jurors to be sworn in and
ordered that the same names be placed in a proper envelope and
eleven new names drawn to complete the grand jury panel. Defense counsel had argued that the trial judge had usurped the
functions of the jury commission by ordering that the same
names be placed in a new envelope. The supreme court upheld
the presiding judge's action, pointing out that the selection of
twenty names for the grand jury list was entirely proper, but
that "an irregularity and gross fraud" had been perpetrated
when six names were glued to the bottom of the envelope. In
such a case it is entirely proper and is the duty of the judge to
take action which will cure the irregularity. This can best be
done by ordering the names selected by the jury commission put
back in a new envelope so that a drawing may be had according
to law.
Defense counsel also objected to the fact that, upon discovering the irregularity, the presiding judge ordered the jury commission to reconvene that afternoon, two and one-half hours
later, to provide for a proper drawing of the names. When the
commission reconvened one of the commissioners was absent.
Three members of the commission constitute a quorum, but only
if all members have been notified of the time and place of the
meeting.3 3 The absent commissioner had been temporarily out
of the parish and notice of the meeting was left at his residence.
Actually he received the notice half an hour before the time set
for the meeting. There was no proof that the lateness of the
notice prevented the commissioner from attending the meeting,
and the court concluded that he could have traversed the eighteen
miles to the courthouse in time if he had left his home immedi31. Id. at Art. 184.
32. 206 La. 770, 20 So. (2d) 131 (1944).
33. Art. 176, La. Code of Crim. Proc. of 1928.

1946]

WORK OF LOUISIANA SUPREME COURT

653

ately after receiving his notice. Even if the lateness of the notice
had caused the commissioner's absence, the court would not have
treated the jury commission as improperly constituted. A diligent effort had been made to serve all members, and this has been
held to satisfy the statutory requirement of notice."4
Short Form Indictments
The practical advantage of the short form indictments,
authorized by Article 235 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, is
nicely illustrated by the case of State v. Pete.15 In that case, defendant had been charged with "the theft of an automobile of
the value of Twelve Hundred ($1200.00) Dollars, the property of
Gordon's Drug Store, Inc." He sought to have his conviction and
sentence set aside on the technical ground that the information,
upon which he was convicted, did not specifically allege that the
taking of the automobile was "with the intent to deprive the
owner thereof permanently." Such an intent, argued appellant,
was essential to the crime of theft,"6 and distinguished that offense from the lesser and related crime of unauthorized use of
movables. 7 In affirming the conviction and sentence, Justice
Fournet pointed out that Article 235 specifically authorized a
charge of theft "by the simple method of describing the property, the subject of the theft, and stating its value."38 In such a
case, continued Justice Fournet, the accused's constitutional guarantee that he shall be fully apprised of the charge against him is
amply protected by the further provision in Article 235 that the
court may, upon request of defense counsel, require the district
attorney to file a bill of particulars. 9 Upon the facts of State v.
Pete, it was obvious that defense counsel had been fully apprised
of the fact that the accused was charged with theft, rather than
unauthorized use of movables. The defense also knew that this
crime required a specific intent to "permanently deprive" the
34. 206 La. 770, 778, 20 So. (2d) 131, 133 (1944), citing cases holding that
the jury commission is properly constituted if a reasonable effort was made
to notify the absent member.
35. 206 La. 1078, 20 So. (2d) 368 (1944). Because of its importance in
upholding the constitutionality of the La. Crim. Code of 1942, and In approving the modern method of simplified draftsmanship employed therein,
the case was discussed by the writer shortly after Justice Fournet's opinion became available, The Work of the Supreme Court for the 1943-1944
Term (1945) 6 LOUISIANA LAW REviEw 173, 174.
36. Art. 67, La. Crim. Code of 1942.
37. Art. 68, La. Crim. Code of 1942.
38. 206 La. 1078, 1083, 20 So. (2d) 368, 370 (1944).
39. See Comment, The Short Form Indictment-History, Development
and Constitutionality (1944) 6 LOUISIANA LAW REVIEW 78.
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true owner of his property. The issues had been clearly drawn,
and a fair trial had been had. After conviction and sentence,
defense counsel sought a reversal on the ground that the indictment had not spelled out each of the elements of the crime
charged, i.e., had not specifically alleged that the property was
taken with an intent to "permanently deprive." It was to avoid
this very sort of technical manipulation, that the short forms
were adopted in modem Codes of Criminal Procedure.
The sufficiency of short form indictments was also upheld
in two other recent decisions. In State v. Young40 the court held
that an indictment charging that the accused committed a battery with a dangerous weapon upon a person named adequately
charged the clime of aggravated battery, in conformity with Article 235. Similarly in State v. Ward41 an information charging
that the defendant "negligently killed one Wilbert Thom.s3," was
upheld. Justice Ponder, speaking for a unanimous court, pointed
out that it was sufficient to follow the short form provided in
Article 235 and that it was unnecessary to set out the means employed or to set out all elements of the crime. The earlier case
of State v. Dean,4 1 wherein it was held necessary to follow the
language of the statute in charging the analogous former crime
of involuntary homicide, 43 was distinguished on the ground that
the statute involved was a general statute. Actually the Dean
case could have been distinguished on a much simpler, and possibly more accurate, basis. The original Article 235 did not provide a short form indictment for the crime of "involuntary homicide," since that offense was not on the statute books in 1928 when
the Code of Criminal Procedure was adopted. When the Criminal Code was adopted in 1942, a companion statute was enacted
which amended the Code of Criminal Procedure so as to adapt
it to the new Criminal Code.4 The amended Article 235 sets out
a short form for the crime of "negligent homicide," which short
form was appropriately followed in the Ward information. If
additional authority is needed, Article 248 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, as pointed out by Justice Ponder, expressly
declares that in murder, manslaughter and negligent homicide,
it shall be sufficient to follow the short forms and shall not be
40. 206 La. 202, 19 So. (2d) 48 (1944).
41. 208 La. 56, 22 So. (2d) 740 (1945).

42. 154 La. 671, 98 So. 82 (1923).
43. La. Act 64 of 1930, §§1-6 [Dart's Crim. Stats. (1932) §§1047-1052], repealed by La. Act 43 of 1942 (La. Crim. Code).
44. La. Act 147 of 1942. For a summary of this statute, see Bennett, The
Louisiana Criminal Code (1942) 5 LOUISIANA LAW REvizw 6, 51, n. 236.
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necessary to set forth the manner of the death or the means by
which it is caused.
Indictment-Crimes Against the Person
In crimes directly affecting the person, the name of the person injured is important. Thus, Article 230 of the Code of Criminal Procedure requires that the name of the person injured, or
some other identification if the name is unknown, must be stated
in the indictment "when the injury is to the person, as in murder, rape or battery.""5 In State v. Varnado" the court held that
the three crimes specified in the article were "mentioned merely
for illustrative purposes,

4

7

and that the name of the person in-

jured was essential to a valid indictment for a conspiracy to commit false imprisonment. It is significant that a similar requirement of Louisiana's prior criminal jurisprudence had been construed as including the crime of false imprisonment.4 8 Also,
Title II of the Criminal Code, designated "Offenses against the

49
Person," includes that offense.

Indictments-Joinder of Several Offenses
Early Louisiana jurisprudence followed the general common
law rule that two or more offenses could be joined in separate
counts of the same indictment if they arose out of the same unlawful transaction and were subject to the same method of trial
and appeal.5 0 Article 218 of the 1928 Code of Criminal Procedure
adopted this liberal joinder rule, but went even further and did
not require that the offenses joined must be subject to the same
mode of trial. There was considerable litigation concerning the
constitutionality of Article 218, which permitted the joinder of
offenses triable by different types of juries.5 Finally, the supreme court decided that the act was unconstitutional insofar
as it provided for a joinder of offenses having a different mode of
trial, but was constitutional insofar as it authorized the joinder of
offenses having the same method of trial and appeal.5 2 In 1932,
45. As amended by La. Act 147 of 1942.
46. 207 La. 1049, 22 So. (2d) 587 (1945).
47. 207 La. 1049, 1056, 22 So. (2d) 587, 589.
48. Marr, Criminal Jurisprudence of Louisiana (2 ed. 1923) §321, n. (a),
cited by the court in 207 La. 1049, 1055, 22 So. (2d) 587, 588.
49. Art. 46, La. Crim. Code of 1942 (False Imprisonment).
50. State v. Hataway, 153 La. 751, 96 So. 556 (1923) and State v. Nejin,
139 La. 912, 72 So. 452 (1916).
51. See Comment (1941) 4 LOUISANA LAw Rmviw 127, discussing the evolution and subsequent status of the rules governing the joinder of criminal
offenses in Louisiana.
52. State v. White, 172 La. 1045, 136 So. 47 (1931).

LOUISIANA LAW

REVIEW

[Vol. VI

the Louisiana legislature repealed Article 218. The repeal was
probably motivated by an objection to the mandatory nature of
the provision which required that all crimes arising out of a
single transaction must be charged in a single indictment (the
joinder rule established in prior Louisiana jurisprudence had
been permissive in nature) and by a fear as to the constitutionality of the article.
Article 217 reads, "Except as otherwise provided under this
title, no indictment shall charge more than one crime ... ." Article 218 had "otherwise provided" that there was to be a joinder
where the offenses arose out of the same transaction. A normal
interpretation of the repeal of Article 218 would be that the general rule of Article 217 is now controlling, and separate indictments will be required. However, in State v. Turner53 the court
indicated, by way of dictum, that while the joinder rule of Article
218 was gone, the common law joinder rule would be recognized
in its stead-and this despite the conclusive language employed
in Article 217. In that case the defendant had been charged in
two counts of an indictment with separate shootings with intent
to murder. The conviction was reversed on other grounds, but
the court stated that there was no misjoinder of offenses, and
declared, "The repeal of Article 218 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, relating to charging two or more offenses in distinct
counts does not have the effect of repealing the common law as
to charging such offenses. 54 In so doing, the court again resorted
to a familiar judicial technique of applying rules of prior jurisprudence to supplement the 1928 Code of Criminal Procedure.
In view of Article 217's unambiguous prohibition against
joinder "except as otherwise provided under this title," it is
doubtful whether the court would be justified in resorting to the
common law rule which appears to conflict with, rather than supplement, the Code of Criminal Procedure.5 5 It is, therefore, not
5
surprising that, in the 1944 case of State v. Carter,"
we find a
dictum statement which indicates a change of view on the question. In that case the defendant had been convicted of attempting, as a part of one continuous transaction, to murder two deputy
sheriffs. The conviction was reversed on other grounds; also, the
motion to compel the district attorney to elect upon which charge
of attempted murder he would proceed came too late, being made
53. 178 La. 927, 152 So. 567 (1934).
54. 178 La. 927, 939, 152 So. 567, 571.
55. For a criticism of this method of judicial interpretation, see Comment (1931) 6 Tulane L. Rev. 135-136.
56. 206 La. 181, 19 So. (2d) 41 (1944).
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after the trial had begun.5 7 However, the court stressed the repeal of Article 218 and concluded that if the motion to elect had
been drawn properly and filed timely the defense would have
5
been entitled to relief.
The conflicting dicta as to the effect of the repeal of Article
218 have left the law governing the joinder of offenses arising
out of one continuous unlawful transaction in a very uncertain
state. The only real solution of this troublesome question is by
a statute which will clearly spell out the law. Both justice and
trial efficiency will be served by permitting, and requiring, that
all crimes arising out of a single act or one continuous unlawful
transaction be charged in one indictment and tried at the same
time. Such a procedure would avoid duplication which serves
no useful purpose, and would also insure a careful consideration
and appraisal of all closely related criminal activity of the accused. The statute should be phrased so as to avoid the constitutional pitfalls which plagued the original Article 218. This could
be accomplished by limiting the new joinder provision to those
offenses which are subject to the same mode of trial and nature
of punishment.5 9 Another practical obstacle to the enactment of
such a statute lies in the fact that the Louisiana jurisprudence
is in considerable confusion as to what is meant by "one continuous unlawful transaction." It is felt by many who are versed
in the practical aspects of criminal law that the cure might be
worse than the disease, and that the trial convenience outlined
above might well amount to trial confusion regardless of the care
exercised in drafting a rejuvenated Article 218.
The Bill of Particulars
It is the function of a bill of particulars to apprise the accused of the details and circumstances of the criminal charge
brought against him by the indictment. The bill of particulars
does not become a part of the indictment, nor can it serve to
validate a defective indictment. This rule of law concerning the
57. Art. 226, La Code of Crim. Proc. of 1928.
58. 206 La. 181, 193, 19 So.

(2d)

41, 44 (1944).

Chief Justice O'Niell,

dissenting, agrees that the motion to elect was filed too late, but disagrees
with the majority opinion as to the impropriety of the joinder of offenses,
206 La. 181, 194, 19 So. (2d) 41, 45.
59. The writer in Comment (1941)

4 LOUISIANA LAW REVIEW 127, 132 (see

note 51, supra) suggests the following amendment: "Article 218. When two
or more crimes which are subject to the same mode of trial and nature of
punishment result from a single act or from one continuous unlawful transaction, only one indictment will lie; but each of the distinct crimes may be
separately charged in distinct counts in the same indictment."
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function and nature of a bill of particulars was clearly illus80
trated and correctly applied in State v. Bienvenu.
In that case
the defendant had been informed against for the crime of gambling with dice for money,61 which had been specifically repealed
by the Criminal Code of 1942. In response to defendant's motion
for a bill of particulars, the district attorney filed a statement of
the facts and circumstances of the crime. If this bill of particulars had been read into and become a part of the original bill of
information, a charge of gambling, as denounced by Article 90 of
the Criminal Code, would have been made out. The statement
in the bill of particulars definitely indicated that the dice game
was conducted "as a business" and under circumstances whereby
the defendant "risks the loss of anything of value in order to
realize a profit. '82 The court held, however, that the indictment
had been brought under the then repealed dice game statute and
that' it could not be transformed by the bill of particulars until
a charge of gambling had been filed as proscribed by Article 90
of the Criminal Code. The fact that defense counsel had requested a bill of particulars did not alter the situation. Justice
Rogers, speaking for the court, declared:

"The sole office of a bill of particulars is to give the adverse
party information which the pleadings by reason of their
generality do not give and to compel the State to observe
certain limitations in offering evidence. A bill of particulars
cannot change the offense charged nor in any way aid an indictment or information fundamentally bad."8 3
While the district attorney has authority to amend bills of information, such amendments must be formally made and are not
effected through a bill of particulars.
Arraignment-Waiver of Jury
In quasi-felony cases, where the punishment proscribed is
imprisonment with or without hard labor, Article 259 of the Code
of Criminal Procedure requires the court to inform the accused
of his right to waive a jury trial and elect to be tried by the judge
4
alone. In State v. Duraso6
the supreme court overruled defense
counsel's technical claim for reversal, which had been predicated
60.
61.
62.
63.
64.

207 La. 859, 22 So. (2d) 196 (1945).
La. Act 70 of 1908 [Dart's Crim. Stats. (1943) §1003-10041.
Quotations from Art. 90, La. Crim. Code of 1942.
207 La. 859, 865, 22 So. (2d) 196, 198.
206 La. 309, 19 So. (2d) 146 (1944).
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upon the trial judge's failure to inform the defendant, at the time
of his arraignment, that he might waive a jury trial. This omission was of no practical significance in view of the fact that the
defendant, with full benefit of counsel, had waived arraignment,
pleaded not guilty, and proceeded to trial before the judge alone.
No possible prejudice could, under the circumstances, be shown
to have resulted. Defense counsel also contended that the right
to a jury trial had not been "expressly waived," as required by
Article 339 of the Code of Criminal Procedure. The court held,
however, that the defendant's proceeding to trial before the judge
alone, as appeared in the minutes of the court, constituted a sufficient manifestation of his desire to waive a jury trial.
It was an important consideration in the instant case that the
accused was represented by counsel throughout. Where a defendant, arraigned without counsel, waives his right to a jury
trial, the court should permit withdrawal of the waiver if the
counsel subsequently appointed decides that the waiver was illadvised;

5

but such a withdrawal of the waiver comes too late

after conviction by the judge trying the case.a6
Bail-Obligationof Bail Bond

In State v. Springer 7 the accused, charged with simple burglary, had been released from custody upon furnishing a $1000.00
appearance bond. In addition to the usual undertaking that the
accused would appear in court on the day of his trial, the bond
included a guaranty that he would "keep the peace in the meantime." While at liberty pending trial, the defendant committed
and was convicted of the crime of robbery. In holding that this
subsequent offense did not effect a forfeiture of the bail bond, the
court pointed out that the bail bond is given for a single purpose
-to secure the appearance of the defendant before the court at
the time and place appointed in the bond.6 8 The added phrase
"and shall keep the peace in the meantime," being totally unauthorized, was treated as surplusage.
Recusal-Substitute Judge
The procedure to be followed when the district judge is recused is set out in Article 305 of the Code of Criminal Procedure.
65. State v. Williams, 202 La. 374, 11 So. (2d) 701 (1942).
66. State v. Robinson, 43 La. Ann. 383, 8 So. 937 (1891).
67. 206 La. 312, 19 So. (2d) 147 (1944).
68. Citing Art. 111, La. Code of Crim. Proc. of 1928, and also prior Louisiana jurisprudence.
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This article provides that "In any criminal case in which a district judge shall be recused, those districts and parishes in which
there shall be more than one district judge excepted, he shall,
for the trial thereof, appoint a lawyer having the qualifications
5 9 the trial
of a judge. . ." to hear the case. In State v. Varnado
was held in a district having two judges. Both of the duly elected
judges recused themselves in compliance with defendant's motion charging that they had a fixed opinion in the case. Thereupon a properly qualified attorney of that district was appointed
as judge ad hoc. Defense counsel moved to vacate the appointment, urging that Article 305 was only applicable to those districts
having but one judge, and that a judge from another judicial
district should have been assigned by the supreme court for the
trial of the case, pursuant to Article 307 of the Code of Criminal
Procedure. The supreme court overruled the motion to vacate;
Justice Hamiter pointed out that Article 307 provides the procedure for appointing a substitute judge in cases where the regular
judge is unable to discharge his duties because of illness or some
other disabling cause; and that Article 305 specifically embraces
those cases where the district judge or judges shall be recused.
The limitation in that article ("those districts and parishes in
which there shall be more than one judge excepted") contemplated the normal case where one of the two judges is recusedin which situation the other judge is to serve. It was not intended
to apply to the rather exceptional facts of the Varnado case,
where both judges were recused. By its understanding and
practical interpretation of Article 305, the court effectuated the
real legislative intent--a purpose which might have been defeated by a literal interpretation of the wording of the article.
Jury-Exclusion of Negroes
The celebrated United States Supreme Court decision in
70
Pierre v. State of Louisiana
enunciated the rule that in cases
where the accused is colored, a systematic exclusion of negroes
from the jury list constitutes a denial of due process and equal
protection of the law. In compliance with that mandate, the
Louisiana Supreme Court, in the first appeal of State v. Anderson,' 1 reversed the conviction and sentence of a negro charged
69. 207 La 1049, 22 So. (2d) 587 (1945).
70. 306 U. S. 354, 59 S. Ct. 536, 83 L. Ed. 757 (1939). See Note (1939) 1
LOUISINA LAW REVIEW 841 re subsequent hearing of the case.
71. 205 La. 710, 18 So. (2d) 33 (1944), discussed, Bennett, Work of Louisiana Supreme Court (1945) 6 LoUISIANA LAW REVIEW 173, 187.
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with the murder of a white man. Evidence established the fact
that, while between ten and twenty per cent of the population
was colored, no negro had ever served on a petit jury and only
one negro name had been included on that particular general
venire list of three hundred names. This, according to the court,
made out a prima facie case of racial discrimination and constituted a denial of due process to the negro defendant.
Two decisions of the 1944-1945 supreme court judicial term
serve to indicate the procedures which must be followed if the
negro defendant is to be accorded a sufficient representation of
his race upon the general venire list and the jury panels. After
the first conviction in the Anderson case had been reversed, the
trial judge ordered the jury commission to purge the general
venire box and to make sure that not less than fifteen per cent of
the new names should be members of the colored race. This was
done, and the jury commission also provided for colored representation on the jury panels selected from the general venire
list. Three of twenty persons listed on the grand jury panel and
twenty of the fifty chosen for the petit jury panel were negroes.
One member of the colored race actually served on the grand
jury which returned the indictment. Six colored veniremen
were drawn and examined in the selection of the petit jury. Of
these, one was excused for a physical deficiency, four were disqualified because of their objection to capital punishment, and
the lone survivor was challenged peremptorily by the state. Thus
the petit jury, as completed, contained no member of the defendant's race. In affirming a second murder conviction, the
Louisiana Supreme Court held that the negro defendant had
been afforded his full constitutional rights; 72 and cited cases
where the United States Supreme Court has frequently held that
racial discrimination is not established by the mere fact that no
members of the colored race were included on the petit jury
finally selected."1
In State v. Dorsey 74 a negro defendant again appealed from
a conviction and sentence for the murder of a white man. The
significant facts relating to the jury commission's procedure in
that case may be briefly itemized as follows: According to the
1940 census figures, the total population of the city of New Or.
leans was 494,537, of which 149,034 were negroes; 1,034 members
72. State v. Anderson, 206 La. 986, 20 So. (2d) 288 (1944).
73. 206 La. 986, 993, 20 So. (2d) 288, 290, the court cited and relied upon
Snowden v. Hughes, 321 U. S. 1, 64 S. Ct. 397, 88 L.Ed. 497 and other United
States Supreme Court decisions.
74. 207 La. 928, 22 So. (2d) 273 (1945).
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of the general venire list were examined, eighty-eight of these
were found to be of the colored race; sixty-nine of the seventyfive persons whose names appeared on the grand jury panel were
interrogated and only one of these was found to be a member of
the colored race; the grand jury which indicted the defendant
did not include any negroes. Before passing upon the defendant's allegation of systematic discrimination, the court examined
members of the jury commission who pointed out the methods
adopted in making up the general venire list. The names were
taken from the telephone directory, the city directory, federal
jury rolls, newspapers and other similar sources. In none of
these lists was any discrimination made as to race or color. Out
of abundant caution and in order to secure a fair proportion of
negro veniremen which would meet the requirements of the
Pierre case, the jury commission also obtained special lists of
negroes from the various colored insurance companies and fraternal organizations. The jury commissioners explained the
fact that the percentage of negroes on the general venire list was
not in true proportion to the percentage of negroes in the population by pointing out that a very large number of the negroes
interviewed as prospective veniremen had been excused upon
their own request. They were day laborers and could not afford
the financial loss entailed by jury service. After considering all
of the above facts, the supreme court upheld the trial judge's
ruling that there had been no discrimination and that a conscientious effort had been made to provide a fair negro representation on the general venire list and the jury lists, "especially when
we take into consideration the economic, the moral, the educational, and other general conditions prevailing among the colored
''
race in the parish of Orleans. 75

Justice Hawthorne, who wrote a very carefully considered and
lengthy opinion in the Dorsey case, overruled defense counsel's
contention that the negro defendant was discriminated against
by the fact that no member of the colored race was included on
the grand jury which returned the indictment. The negro defendant does not have an absolute right to have a jury composed
in part of members of his race. "So to hold," declared Justice
75. 207 La. 928, 950, 22 So. (2d) 273, 280. The court cited, 207 La. 928, 953,
22 So. (2d) 273, 281, the case of Thomas v. Texas, 212 U. S. 278, 29 S. Ct. 393
(1909) for the purpose of showing that failure to give the negro race a full
pro-rata representation on the jury list is not discrimination per se; and also
pointed out, as a make-weight argument, that the approximately 9 per cent
of colored names on the general venire list was nearly double the average

percentage of negroes in the federal jury box for that particular district of
Louisiana.
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Hawthorne, "under the facts in this case would be tantamount
to saying that it was the mandatory duty of the district judge
the memto place on the grand jury which found the indictment
76
ber of the colored race who was on the jury panel.1
The second Anderson case and the Dorsey case illustrate the
importance of the jury commission in the preparation of the general venire list and the jury panels, exercising great care to see
that the colored race is represented in a fair proportion to the
negroes in the population who are qualified and available for
jury service. At the same time they indicate that the guarantee
of fair representattion is not a guarantee that a particular grand
jury or petit jury must include colored members in cases where
the accused is of the colored race. The procedures followed in
those cases accord with due process and represent a conscientious
effort to adhere to the requirements of the Constitution as construed and enunciated in the Pierre case.
Competency of Juror
It is within the sound discretion of the trial judge to determine whether a juror suffering from a physical infirmity is competent to serve in a particular case.7 7 In State v. Reed 78 the trial
court's determination, based upon his own examination, that a
juror's hearing was not so impaired as to render him incapable
of serving in the case, was upheld. The supreme court appeared
to be satisfied that the trial judge's investigation of the juror's
auditory capacity was sufficiently thorough, and the opinion
further stated that "The discretion vested in the judge by the
code article should not be interfered with except in case of
7
abuse." 0
76. Justice Hawthorne declared [207 La. 928, 954, 22 So. (2d) 273, 2811:
"On the grand jury panel of 75 names, being the panel from which the
grand jury which indicted the defendant herein was selected by the district
judge, we find the name of one member of the colored race. However, defendant complains there was no negro on the grand jury that found the
indictment, and alleges that there has not been a negro on a grand jury in
the Parish of Orleans for a period of 25 years. Under the facts in this
case, this complaint simply means that defendant is claiming the right to
have a jury composed in part of members of his own race. This we do
not understand to be the law. So to hold under the facts in this case would
be tantamount to saying that it was the mandatory duty of the district judge
to place on the grand jury which found the indictment the member of the
colored race who was on the jury panel." The court relies upon the U. S.
Supreme Court decision of Commonwealth of Virginia v. Rives, 100 U. S.
313, 322, 25 L. Ed. 667 (1879), wherein It Is held that due process and equal
protection do not mean that the colored defendant is guaranteed a jury
composed in part of colored men.
77. Art. 172, La. Code of Crim. Proc. of 1928.
78. 206 La. 143, 19 So. (2d) 28 (1944).
79. 206 La. 143, 147, 19 So. (2d) 28, 29.
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Civange of Venue
Either the district attorney or defense counsel may apply to

the court for a change of venue if he has good reason to believe
that "by reason of prejudice existing in the public mind or some
other sufficient cause, described by him, an impartial trial cannot
be obtained in the parish wherein the indictment is pending ...." In State v. Washington8' the defendant was charged
with the murder of a member of the police department of the
city of Bastrop. Defense counsel moved for a change of venue,
alleging that a fair and impartial trial could not be had in Morehouse Parish because of the general prejudice against the defendant which resulted from the decedent police officer's popularity
and numerous family connections throughout the parish. In upholding the decision of the trial judge who had overruled the
defendant's motion for a change of venue, the supreme court laid
considerable stress on the fact that the defense had only used
nine of its twelve peremptory challenges in the empanelling
of the jury. This substantiated the conclusion that the local resentment was not so strong or so universal as to prevent the securing of a fair and impartial jury. The court also cited the case
of State v. Roberson8 2 for the general proposition that "application for a change of venue is addressed to the sound discretion
of the trial judge and his ruling thereon will not be disturbed
unless an abuse of that discretion is shown."
Sequestration of Witnesses
The sequestration of witnesses provided for in Article 371 of
the Code of Criminal Procedure is a matter which is addressed to
the sound discretion of the trial judge. This judicial discretion,
however, is not absolute and unreviewable. It must be reasonably exercised with the view of carrying out the purport and
intent of the sequestration provision, i.e., "to elicit truth and
promote the ends of justice.8' 3 In State v. Carter 4 a negro was
charged with attempted murder of two deputy sheriffs. The principal issues were whether the shooting was in self-defense, and
whether it was in the heat of mutual combat which might reduce
the crimes to attempted manslaughter. In excluding state and
80. Art. 292, Ia. Code of Crim. Proc. of 1928.
81. 207 La. 849, 22 So. (2d) 193 (1945).

82. 159 La. 562, 105 So. 621 (1925).

Accord: State v. Price, 192 La. 615, 188

So. 718 (1939).

83. Roberts v. State, 100 Neb. 199, 204, 158 N.W. 930, 932 (1916).
84. 206 La. 181, 19 So. (2d) 41 (1944).
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defense witnesses from the courtroom, the trial judge refused to
sequester three deputy sheriffs and a special investigator of the
district attorney's office, all of whom were witnesses, for the state.
No special .reaspn was given for excepting these witnesses from
the sequestration order., The trial ,judge had merely asserted
that. "the ordering or refusing to jorder sequestration of the witnesses, is within the sound discretion of the court." The supreme
court held, that the trial, court's.,ruling in excluding these state's
witnesses from the sequestration, order was an abuse of discretion and reyersible error. It is important to the fair administration of justice, reasoned the court, for such material witnesses to
be removed from the courtroom so as to, avoid, the possibility of
their being guided and .influenced by the testimony of others.
Also, Article 371 does not, authorize a general exemption of all
court officers, regardless of the, importance of their testimony,
from an order for, the, sequestration: of witnesses. The supreme
court indicated, however, that the trial judge's ruling in the Carter case might have been justified if the presence in the cop.rtroom
during, the trial of ,the ,three deputies and the investigator. had
been necessary to assist the district attorney in making out his
case.

Just how strong, such special circumstances must be in

order, to justify an exception to the sequestration order, the court
did. not say., Certainly a mere statement by. the trial judge that
he believes the presence of witnesses necessary to the state's case
would not be sufficient. -Some idea of the circumstances which
would, justify an exception to the sequestration order may be
gathered from the subsequent case of State v. Barton.,' In that
case the exemption of a medical officer, an investigating officer,
and two peace officers from an order of sequestration of witnesses was upheld. In so doing, Justice Hawthorne stressed
the trial judge's per curiam statement that the witnesses excluded
from the sequestration order testified only to the facts brought
out by their .respective investigations, and that there was nothing
in the record to impeach this statement. The court distinguished
the Carter decision, pointing ,out that the trial judge ,in that case
assigned no reason for overruling the defendant's motion to sequester the state's witnesses, but simply stated that it was within
his discretion to do so. While holding that the trial. judge had
not abusedhis discretion in the instant case, the supreme court
reiterated. its previous statement that Article .371 of the Code of
Criminal Procedure does not authorize district judges to make.a
rule of court exempting all court officers from an order of seques85. 207 La. 820, 22 So. (2d) 183 (1945).
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tration of witnesses regardless of the importance or nature of
their testimony.
District Attorney's Opening Statement
The Code of Criminal Procedure stipulates that the reading
of the indictment to the jury shall be followed by an opening
statement by the district attorney "explaining the nature of the
charge and the evidence by which he expects to establish the
same." 86 While the Louisiana Supreme Court has uniformly
held that it is the mandatory duty of the prosecution to make an
opening statement; it has generally manifested a very liberal attitude toward the opening statement. It has permitted the district attorney to supplement or amend his opening statement,s7
and has held that references in the opening statement to inadmissible evidence do not constitute reversible error.8 '
In State v. Barton 9 the district attorney in his opening statement read from a written statement of a prospective witness
what occurred at the time of the alleged aggravated battery.
Defense counsel objected that the statement in question was inadmissible hearsay evidence since the witness was available to
testify. The trial judge overruled the objection, but instructed
the jury that no hearsay evidence would be admitted and that
they would be properly instructed when the testimony was
offered. Actually the statement was used in cross examination
of the witness. In holding that the defendant's rights had been
adequately safeguarded, the supreme court continued the sound
liberal attitude manifested by its earlier decisions, and declared
that, "The scope and extent of the district attorney's opening
statement are within the control of the trial judge, in the exercise of a wise discretion, and convictions will not be set aside for
error therein
unless the rights of the defendant were plainly
''
violated. "

This same liberality has not been adopted in regard to the
district attorney's opening statement concerning a confession by
86. Art. 333, La. Code of Crim. Proc. of 1928.
87. State v. Peyton. 194 La. 681, 194 So. 715 (1940).
88. State v. Sharbino, 194 La. 709, 194 So. 756 (1940), noted in (1940) 3
LOUiSIANA LAW ReviEw 238. The court pointed out that what is said in the
opening statement cannot be regarded as evidence erroneously admitted,
since it has no binding effect and is designed only "to enable the jury to
understand and appreciate the testimony as it falls from the lips of the witnesses." (194 La. 709, 716, 194 So. 756, 758.)
89. 207 La. 820, 22 So. (2d) 183 (1945).
90. 207 La. 820, 828, 22 So. (2d) 183, 186, citing State v. Sharbino, 194
La. 709, 194 So. 756 (1940), discussed supra note 88, and other Louisiana decisions.
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the accused. The confession must be referred to in the opening
statement or it is inadmissible in evidence.9 1 Where the confession is read in the opening statement it constitutes reversible
error if it subsequently proves inadmissible.9 2 This strict attitude is easily understandable in view of the significance which
the jury invariably attaches to confessions.
Continuance
The granting or refusing of a continuance, in order to give
counsel additional time to prepare for the trial or to secure the
presence of a witness, "is within the sound discretion of the trial
judge," and only an "arbitrary or unreasonable abuse of such
discretion" is reviewable on appeal.9 3 In State v. White"4 the defendant was indicted on May 2 for aggravated rape, and the defendant's trial was begun on May 15. The trial court refused
a continuance from 10 o'clock p.m. until the following morning,
which defense counsel sought in order to have additional time
to secure a witness for whom an instanter subpoena had been
issued at the inception of the trial. The trial judge, in his per
curiam, pointed out that there was no assurance that the witness
could be found by the following morning, that when the court
ordered the instanter subpoena it had notified defendant that
no continuance would be granted if he was not present when
called, that the court had permitted defense counsel to summon
several witnesses after the trial had commenced, and that the
defendant had at least one other witness to testify to the facts he
sought to prove by the absent witness. In holding that the refusal to delay the trial was a proper exercise of judicial discretion, the supreme court stressed the facts that the defendant had
not
used due diligence in summoning the witness and that
the
testimony sought to be introduced by him was merely cumulative in nature.
Insanity-Mental Examination of the Accused
Article 267 of the Code of Criminal Procedure sets out the
procedure governing pleas of insanity. Where a defendant is, by
reason of insanity or mental deficiency, "unable to understand
91. State v. Silsby, 176 La. 727, i46 So. 684 (1933); State v. Elmore, 177
La. 877, 149 So. 507 (1933); State v. Garrity, 178 La. 541, 152 So. 77 (1933);
State v. Ward, 187 La. 585, 175 So. 69 (1937).
92. State v. Cannon, 184 La. 514, 520, 166 So. 485, 487 (1936).
93. Art. 320, La. Code of Crim. Proc. of 1928.
94. 206 La. 744, 20 So. (2d) 10 (1944),
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the proceedings against him or to assist in his defense" it is the
duty of the court to take steps to have him committed to a proper
institution where he will remain until such time as he becomes
mentally capable of participating in the trial. Realizing that the
plea of present insanity was sure to be overworked by attorneys
representing defendants whose conviction was almost assured,
the draftsmen of the Code of Criminal Procedure wisely provided
that the trial judge was required to fix a hearing to determine the
defendant's mental condition only if he had "reasonable ground
to believe that the defendant was insane." Also, when a hearing
is granted, the court "may" appoint two disinterested qualified
experts to inquire into the present mental condition of the accused. In State v. Washington, 5 defense counsel pleaded present
insanity. After the testimony of three physicians who had examined the accused for physical disability, and of several lay witnesses, indicated definitely that the accused was presently sane
and that the plea was being made for dilatory purposes, the trial
judge refused to appoint specialists to examine into the defendant's mental condition and overruled the plea. In upholding the
trial judge's rulings, the supreme court pointed out that the evidence presented did not furnish a reasonable ground for believing that the defendant was presently insane, and that, under the
circumstances, the trial judge had not abused his discretion by
refusing to appoint psychiatrists to examine the defendant with
regard to his mental condition. This was in accord with previous
supreme court decisions wherein the trial judge has been upheld
in exercising his sound judicial discretion in such a manner as
6
to thwart dilatory tactics.
Suspended Sentence-Effect of Jury Recommendation
The jury's recommendation that a defendant found guilty of
a felony shall be placed on probation9 7 is not binding on the sentencing judge. He may disregard the recommendation and impose a regular sentence if he feels that the jury has allowed sentiment to run away with its better judgment. In State v. Young98
95. 207 La. 849, 22 So. (2d) 193 (1945).
96. The court quotes from and follows the leading Louisiana case of State
v. Ridgeway, 178 La. 606, 152 So. 306 (1933).
97. See Louisiana Legislation of 1944 (1944) 6 LoUISANA LAW Rvnvw 1,
19 for a discussion of the 1944 amendment to Art. 530 of the Code of Crimihal Procedure, whereby the requirement of a jury recommendation is limited to those cases actually tried by a jury. The judge may place the convicted felon on probation without any jury action in cases where the offender pleads guilty or waives a jury and is tried by the judge alone.
98. 206 La. 202, 19 So. (2d) 48 (1944).
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the jury returned a verdict finding the defendant guilty of aggravated battery as charged and asking the mercy of the court.
Actually they intended to recommend that the offender be placed
on probation. The trial judge refused to permit the jurors to
testify to thus qualify their verdict, and imposed a sentence of
two years in the state penitentiary. In affirming the conviction
and sentence, the supreme court took the view that the defendant
had not been materially prejudiced by the jury's mistake in
framing its verdict. Justice Rogers, speaking for the court,
stressed the fact that the sentencing judge is free to disregard
the jury's recommendation that the offender be placed on probation. The imposition of a two year sentence, when a term for
a few months might have been imposed, indicated, according to
the court, that the trial judge did not agree with the jury's recommendation of judicial clemency. That argument is not conclusive, however, for the two year sentence imposed was only
one-fifth of the maximum possible sentence of ten years. The
sentencing judge might have been willing to impose a suspended
sentence of two or three years and place the offender on probation, and yet unwilling to let him off with a short jail sentence.
The principal issue presented was not directly answered,
i.e., should a jury be permitted to testify in order to qualify an
erroneously stated verdict? The verdict was returned as a
straight verdict of guilty, and the recommendation of mercy was
mere surplusage29 Even assuming that difference between the
verdict returned and the one intended might have a very material effect upon the sentence imposed, it is submitted that the
supreme court was correct in upholding the trial judge's ruling
whereby he refused to permit testimony by the jurors to qualify
or impeach the unequivocal language of the verdict actually
rendered."
Newly Discovered Evidence-Basis for New Trial
Article 511 of the Code of Criminal Procedure limits the
rights of the accused to a new trial for newly discovered evidence to cases where "reasonable diligence" has been exercised
to discover the evidence before and during the trial, where the
evidence is not "merely cumulative," and where it "is so material that it ought to produce a different result than the verdict
reached." In State v. Alberts0 1 the defendant had been convicted
99. See State v. Doucet, 177 La. 63, 147 So. 500 (1933).
100. 23 C. J. S. Crim. Law §§1412 and 1415 (1940).
101. 206 La. 213, 19 So. (2d) 98 (1944).
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of murder and sentenced to death. Defense counsel moved for
a new trial on the ground that a newly discovered witness was
prepared to testify that the fatal stabbing occurred in the heat
of mutual combat. This testimony, it was claimed, might induce
the jury to find the defendant guilty of the lesser criminal homicide of manslaughter, or, at least, to qualify their murder verdict.
The trial judge overruled the motion for a new trial. In upholding this ruling the supreme court pointed out that the newly
discovered evidence did not meet the requirements of Article
511. The defendant had not exercised due diligence to discover
the new witness before trial, as evidenced by the fact that other
available witnesses could have supplied the names of those
present at the affray. Also, the fact was well established that
the fatal stabbing resulted from defendant's attack upon the deceased, who had tried to act as peacemaker in a fight. Since all
testimony pointed to the fact that the defendant went after the
deceased with a knife and did not pick the knife up in the heat
of battle, the new witness' testimony that he did not see a
knife did not impress the court.' ° The decision is further
strengthened by an application of the generally accepted principle that the trial judge is vested with a wide discretion in ruling on a motion for a new trial based on newly discovered evidence.103 The trial judge's opinion as to "due diligence"'104 or as
to the materiality and credibility of the newly discovered testimony' 05 will not be reversed except for manifest error.1

6

Chief Justice O'Niell concurred in the decree but pointed out
that where the newly discovered evidence is "merely cumulative"
it should still be sufficient basis for a new trial when it would,
if believed by the jury, affect the verdict. "The fact that a defendant accused of a crime may have one witness to prove a material fact in his favor is no reason why he should be denied the
benefit of other witnesses to prove the same fact."'10

7

While Chief

Justice O'Niell's dictum statement is not in accord with a literal
interpretation of the language of Article 511, it is a very sound
and practical analysis of the problem. While cumulative evi102. The court states, 206 La. 213, 227, 19 So. (2d) 98, 102, that "the statement in the alidavit that he saw no knife does not necessarily mean that
Alberts did not have a knife, but merely that the witness did not see it."
103. 206 La. 213, 228, 19 So. (2d) 98, 103, citing State v. Heintz, 174 La.
219, 140 So. 28 (1932). Accord: State v. Long, 4 La. Ann. 441 (1849); State
v. Pouncey, 182 La. 511, 162 So. 60 (1935).
104. State v. Spooner, 41 La. Ann. 780, 6 So. 879 (1889).
105. State v. Saba, 203 La. 881, 14 So. (2d) 751 (1943), noted in (1943) 5
LOUISIANA LAW REVIEW 474.
106. State v. Wilburn, 196 La. 113, 198 So. 765 (1940).
107. 206 La. 213, 230, 19 So. (2d) 98, 103.
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dence will, as in the. instant, case, seldom serve as the basis of a
new trial, there may well be a. case where the cumulative evidence is much .more significant than the original evidence directed.toward the same end. In such a case it might be,"so
material that it ought to.produce a different result from the verdict reached," and the granting of a new trial would be necessary
in order to prevent a miscarriage of justice.
Defective Indictment-Motion in Arrest
The case of State v. Bienvenu'08 applied the well settled principle that a substantial defect in an indictment or information
may be availed of at any time. In that case the indictment was
fatally defective, being predicated upon, a criminal statute. which
had been repealed by the Criminal Code of 1942. The accused
filed a.motion for and secured a bill of particulars, fully but unsuccessfully defended the case,, and then after conviction and sentence movedin arrest of judgment. In his motion he urged that
the information upon which he had been convicted was fatally
defective in that no existing state statute denounced the offense
for which he was charged., Following a well settled line of decisions, the court held that the motion in arrest of judgment should
be sustained, notwithstanding the failure of the defendant to demur or move to quash the bill of information during the earlier
stages of the proceedings. A verdict of guilty, founded upon a
substantially defective indictment, is completely ineffective and
a sentence thereunder unauthorized. 1°9
Appeal-Order Granting New Trial
I According to the weight of authority, the trial judge should
not set aside a verdict of guilty, as being "contrary to the law
and the evidence," 110 -if there was any evidence upon which the
jury could have reasonably based their conclusion. Louisiana
had adopted a more liberal view and holds-that the trial judge
may ,set aside a verdict if he feels that the jury is wrong and entertains a reasonable doubt as to the defendant's guilt."'. In
ascertaining the right to appeal from the trial judge's ruling -in
granting or refusing a motion for a new trial based upon the
108. 207 La. 859, 22 So. (2d) 196 (1945).
109. In so holding, the court relied upon the leading case of State v.
McDonald, 178 La. 612, 152 So; 308 (1934) and upon the express language of
Art 405 of the Code of Crim. Proc. of 1928.
110. Art. 509, La. Code of Crim. Proc. of 1928.
111. State v. Daspit, 167 La. 52, 118 So. 690 (1928).
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insufficiency of the evidence, it is important to note that a question of fact is usually involved and that the appellate jurisdiction of the supreme court in criminal cases is limited to questions
of law alone.a 2 Thus the refusal of a trial judge to grant the
motion is only appealable in those cases where there was no evidence to support the conviction. In such cases, the trial judge
makes an error of law in not granting a new trial.113 Where a
new trial is granted, the state, regardless of the incorrectness of
the trial judge's ruling, is without any right of appeal. This rule
was applied in State v. White," 4 where the supreme court refused
to inquire into the propriety of an order granting a new trial to
a defendant who had been convicted of negligent homicide. Justice Ponder pointed out that the granting of a new trial is not a
final disposition of the case, and that under Article 540 of the
Code of Criminal Procedure, appeal only lies from a final prejudicial judgment. He also applied the well settled constitutional
principle that the supreme court has neither appellate nor supervisory jurisdiction to review rulings of the trial judge which are
based upon questions of fact rather than law. The trial court's
holding that the evidence did not support the verdict, especially
in view of the Louisiana rule which authorizes the granting of a
new trial where the trial judge disagrees with the jury's conclusions, did not present a question of law over which the supreme court has jurisdiction.
Appeal--Juvenile Delinquency Decree
A judgment of the juvenile court, in parishes other than
Orleans, adjudicating a juvenile to be a neglected or delinquent
child and committing him to the Louisiana Training Institute, is
appealable to the supreme court on questions of law only. 1 5 In
State v. McDonald,116 the defendant had been adjudged a delin112. La. Const. of 1921, Art. VII, §10.
113. State v. Martinez, 201 La. 949, 10 So. (2d) 712 (1942).
114. 207 La. 695, 21 So. (2d) 877 (1945).

115. La. Const. of 1921, Art. VII, §54. This provision was amended pursuant to La. Act 309 of 1944 so as to authorize appeals on matters of both

law and fact where the judgment of the court "effects the custody, care and
control of minor children." In delinquency proceedings, the appeals are still
limited to matters of law. Cf. Art. VII, §96, of the La. Const. of 1921, which

governs juvenile proceedings in Orleans Parish, was amended, pursuant to
La. Act 322 of 1944 so as to permit an appeal on both law and facts in all
Orleans Parish juvenile cases. For a criticism of this uniquely broad right
of appeal, see Bennett, Louisiana Legislation of 1944 (1944) 6 LOUisINA LAW
RvIEw 9, 23.
116. 206 La. 732, 20 So. (2d) 6 (1944)

discussed in Jackson, The Right to

Bail and Suspensive Appeal in the Louisiana Juvenile Courts (1946) 20 Tulane
L. Rev. 363, 370.
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quent child and ordered committed for an indefinite period to the
Louisiana Training Institute in Monroe. In granting an appeal,
the judge of the juvenile court had refused to make it suspensive
and had ordered that the juvenile be retained in the custody of
the Chief Probation Officer pending his transfer to the training
institute. Defense counsel applied to the supreme court for appropriate writs to compel the judge to grant a suspensive appeal,
arguing that an adult who is convicted and sentenced in the juvenile court for offenses involving juveniles may appeal suspensively. In overruling this argument, Justice Rogers emphasized
the distinction between the conviction and sentencing of an adult
-a criminal prosecution-and the hearing and adjudication in a
juvenile delinquency proceeding which results in commitment to
a correctional rather than a penal institution. The court held
that the rule allowing a suspensive appeal from a criminal conviction should not be applied by analogy to an appeal from an
adjudication in a delinquency proceeding, and pointed out the
practical consideration that it would defeat the very purpose of
the delinquency proceedings if the lodging of an appeal should
result in temporarily returning the delinquent child to the custody of those whose neglect had so largely contributed to the
condition which the court is seeking to correct. The court also
stressed the well settled principle that the right to a stay of execution pending appeal must be expressly provided and is not to
be implied." 7
Appeal from Municipal Court Judgment
The Louisiana Supreme Court's appellate 'jurisdiction over
municipal court judgments is specifically limited to those cases
where a fine exceeding three hundred dollars, or imprisonment
exceeding six months, is actually imposed, or where the constitutionality or legality of the penalty is attacked. 18 In other
cases, the appeal from a municipal court judgment is to the dis117. The fact that the constitutional provision governing appeals from
the juvenile court in Orleans Parish (La. Const. of 1921, Art. VII, §96)
expressly provides that an appeal from the juvenile court shall not suspend
the judgment appealed, and that no similar limitation is expressly included
in the constitutional provision governing appeals from juvenile courts other
than Orleans Parish (La. Const. of 1921, Art VII, §54) is not a suficient
reason for implying the right to a suspensive appeal in the latter case.
Defense counsel's argument along this line was definitely and properly overruled by the court, which laid stress upon the fundamental principle that
the right to suspension of the execution of judgments must be expressly
given and cannot be read in by implication.
118. La. Const. of 1921, Art. VII, §10.
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trict court. 119 In State v. Delia,1 20 a defendant had been convicted
in the city court of the illegal sale of intoxicating liquor and sentenced to pay a fine of five hundred dollars. The district court
affirmed the conviction and dismissed defendant's appeal, since
the fine was in excess of the three hundred dollar limit of that
court's appellate jurisdiction; whereupon defendant appealed to
the supreme court from the district court's decision. In dismissing the appeal, the supreme court relied upon a previous
holding that in such cases "the appeal is direct to the supreme
court. The course to be followed is direct to that court, and does
not diverge to another court, so as to enable the appellant to take
two appeals-one to the district court, and, if unsuccessful, then
another to the supreme court.'' 1 2 Defense counsel's mistake was

in appealing from the district's court's decision. Provided the
time limitation on the right of appeal had not expired, the defendant would still have a right of direct appeal from the municipal court's judgment to the supreme court. The appeal erroneously taken to the district court was dismissed because of lack
of jurisdiction and without any hearing on the merits. Thus the
supreme court could entertain defendant's appeal without his
having the benefit of two appeals. A contrary holding denying
the right of direct appeal would exact an unduly severe penalty
of a defendant whose attorney made an erroneous choice as to
the proper appellate tribunal. The previous decision, relied upon
in the instant case, merely held that the supreme court will not
compel the district court to take jurisdiction or to grant an appeal
from its judgment to the supreme court.
In Town of Sulphur v. Stanley,' 22 the defendant's conviction

and sentence to serve thirty days in jail for disturbing the peace
had been properly appealed to the district court. In accordance
with the express language of Article VII, Section 36, of the Louisiana Constitution, the district judge heard the case de novo.
Again, the defendant was found guilty as charged. The district
court's judgment was reviewed by the supreme court upon appeal
and pursuant to a writ of certiorari with a rule nisi granted by
that court. In affirming the district court's judgment, the supreme court emphasized the fact that the case "was tried de novo
in the district court, that is to say, it was tried on its merits anew
from the beginning with the view of determining the question
119.
120.
121.
113 La.
122.

Id. at Art. VII, §36.
206 La. 574, 19 So. (2d) 257 (1944).
Quoting from State ex rel. Hart v. Judge of First District Court,
654, 657, 37 So. 546, 547 (1904).
207 La. 1075, 22 So. (2d) 655 (1945).
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of whether the relator was guilty of disturbing the peace by
being drunk on the streets of the town of Sulphur."' 1 23

In view

of the nature of the proceedings the district judge was entirely
justified in excluding any and all testimony concerning the procedure and trial in the mayor's court and the alleged political
prejudice existing against the accused. The supreme court refused to pass upon the correctness of the district judge's findings
of fact, reiterating the well settled constitutional limitation that
questions of fact relating to the guilt or innocence of the accused
are not reviewable by that court. In the companion case of State
v. Stanley,124 the supreme court dismissed an appeal from the de-

fendant's conviction and sentence in the district court. In addition to the considerations and questions which it had reviewed
and disposed of in discharging the rule nisi, the supreme court
pointed out that the defendant's only right of appeal was to the
district court, and that he was not entitled to a second appeal
from that court's judgment to the supreme court. The appellate
jurisdiction of the Louisiana Supreme Court in misdemeanor
cases is limited to controversies where the constitutionality or
legality of an ordinance or of a penalty imposed shall be in question, or where the sentence imposed is a fine exceeding three
25
hundred dollars or imprisonment exceeding six months.
IX. MISCELLANEOUS MATTERS
ATTORNEYS.

AUcTIoNEERS.

BROKERS

Paul M. Hebert*
ATTORNEYS-DISBARMENT

Three disbarment proceedings were considered by the court
during the 1944-1945 term.
In Louisiana State Bar Association v. Steiner' the defendant
excepted to the jurisdiction of the court rationae personae. He
contended that his absence from the state and the fact that he
was not, at the time of the institution of disbarment proceedings,
an active member of the bar, having been suspended from the
practice of law for two years in a prior proceeding,2 ousted the
court's jurisdiction. These contentions were summarily dismissed
123. 207 La. 1075, 1079, 22 So. (2d) 655, 656.
124. 207 La. 1082, 22 So. (2d) 657 (1945).
125. La. Const. of 1921, Art. VII, §10.
* Dean and Professor of Law, Louisiana State University Law School.
1. 207 La. 408, 21 So. (2d) 426 (1945).
2. Louisiana State Bar Ass'n v. Steiner, 204 La. 1073, 16 So. (2d) 843 (1944).

